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Abstract
A golden parachute is a potentially lucrative wage contract that
compensates officers or other key executives of a corporation in the
event of a change in control.’
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I.

Introduction to Golden Parachutes

A golden parachute is a potentially lucrative wage contract that
compensates officers or other key executives of a corporation in the
event of a change in control.' They are rapidly becoming a corporation's newest defensive weapon in a takeover battle. For example, if a
takeover should occur which results in the replacement of existing management, the golden parachute would assure an ousted officer that he
would be compensated. The ousted officer's compensation may be as
high as several million dollars. Thus, an executive receives a golden
profit when he "bails out" from his position.
Golden parachutes come in many forms, such as specific job titles,
bonuses, or pension plans, but most often are simply a lump sum of
money.2 Although contractural perks for top management are not new,
there is a sharp distinction between golden parachutes and other attractive executive compensation plans. Golden parachutes are triggered
when there is a change in control of the corporation. If control never
changes, then the executive never receives the parachute compensation.
Thus, although justified as just another type of executive compensation,
the frequent implementation of golden parachutes by corporations following a wave of merger and takeover activities in the late 1970's and
early 1980's clearly underlies one main objective - to fend off
takeovers. 4
Arguably, golden parachutes are accomplishing that objective. In
1983, for example, tender offers fell to a six year low in terms of frequency and value.5 While some analysts partially credit a strong stock
market for this decline, other analysts credit the increased use of effec1. Note, Golden Parachutes- Executive Compensation or Executive Overreaching?, 9 J. CORP. LAW 346 (1984).
2. McLaughlin, On Golden Parachutes, 17 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Summer
1982, at 23.
3. Id. at 22.
4. Id.
5. Austin & Jackson, Tender Offer Update: 1984, 19 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,

Spring 1984, at 63.
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tive defensive tactics by target companies as a major factor.6 Therefore,
it appears as though golden parachutes have had a solid impact in discouraging takeover attempts. With approximately sixty percent of the
top one thousand American corporations now using golden parachutes,
a strong case can be made that no executive should be without one.
Corporate directors continue to justify golden parachutes mainly
on the presumption that they attract and keep top-quality management." Other directors question this reasoning, claiming that an executive's primary motivation during a tender offer period should derive
from fighting to save their own company. Officers want to remain in
command and not become part of another company. 9 This is the attitude that was taken by William Agee, who was the past President of
Bendix Corporation. Mr. Agee claimed his golden parachute did not
alter his strategy in his takeover battle with Martin Marietta Corporation and Allied. 10 Therefore, the existence of a golden parachute may
often attract an "extremely compensation oriented director-officer who
can adopt a laissez-faire attitude during a takeover.""1 The premise of
attracting top-quality management may be just an illusion and the
prevalence of golden parachutes may be the result of corporate "follow
the leader games".12
Whatever the justification may be for a golden parachute, arguably those who are most adversely affected by them are corporate shareholders. A director-officer owes a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of shareholders, especially during a tender offer period.1 3 A golden
parachute may lead a director-officer to become more concerned with
his bail out bonus than in representing the best interests of the shareholders. Even with this obvious potential conflict courts and legislatures
are reluctant to take any concrete measures to restrict their use. Only
the Internal Revenue Service has taken a major active step to limit the

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., FORBES, Nov. 22 1982, at 238. However, other surveys have been
more conservative, estimating 15-30 percent of major corporations. See generally Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982 at 82.
8. Morrison, supra note 7, at 83.
9. Id. at 84.
10. Id.
11. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 24.
12. Id. at 23.
13. H. HENN & J.ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 207 (1983).
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use of golden parachutes. 14 Yet the question remains whether the IRS
is the proper agency and is using the proper methods to resolve the
issue of golden parachutes.
This note will explore the reasons that the mere existence of a
golden parachute can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.
Special emphasis will be given to examining golden parachutes which
are created during a tender offer period. Also, the remedies that a
shareholder may have in the form of a derivative lawsuit under state
law or an action under the Williams Act 15 under federal law will be set
forth. Finally, the 1984 Tax Reform Act' 6 will be examined to show its
restrictive effect on golden parachutes.
II.

The Golden Parachute and the Tender Offer: a Breach of
Fiduciary Duty

Corporations have the power to create golden parachutes by virtue
of The Model Business Corporation Act.. 7 Adopted in full by twentyfive states and in part by virtually every state, the Model Business Corporation Act provides that the power to pay pension, stock option plans,
and any other incentive plans for directors, officers and employees are
among the express general powers of a corporation.' 8 Furthermore, the
courts have reinforced this power by continually recognizing the importance of incentive plans to the success of a corporation, and courts will
only interfere if an incentive plan is deemed to constitute a waste of
corporate assets.' 9 To constitute waste, however, there must be a clear
misuse of the corporation's assets. This misuse must amount to a gift to
a director with no relation to business activities. 20 Without such a flagrant abuse of a corporation's funds, courts are reluctant to become
involved.
Most courts will simply apply the business judgment rule, a court
14.
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 86-93.
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended

at 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(e)).
16.

I.R.C. § 280 (G) (1984) amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.

90-369, § 46, 98 Stat. 588 (1984).
17. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT.

ANN. 2D

§4(k) (1971).

18. Id. "Besides express powers pursuant to statute or the articles of incorporation, corporations enjoy various implied powers." See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 13, § 183 (1983).
19. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
20. Id. at 591.

Published by NSUWorks, 1985

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4

Nova Law Journal

[Vol. 9

created concept which states that absent a showing of bad faith, the
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board of direc-

tors.2 Thus, the business judgment rule allows a corporation much
flexibility in managing its activities. The rule probably includes compensation arrangements such as golden parachutes. A board of directors is able to defend its activities on the basis of the business judgment
rule and are often successful because courts do not want to be put in
the position of "second-guessing management."2 2 Furthermore, the

courts have expanded their use of the business judgment rule by now
allowing a board of directors to use the rule not only as an affirmative
defense but also as a preemptive weapon for the dismissal of a shareholder's derivative suit.23 When a corporation can show that a deriva-

tive suit is not in the best interest of the corporation the board of directors may be allowed to terminate the shareholder's action.2 4 Although

the preemptive use of the business judgment rule has yet to be implemented in relation to golden parachutes its application seems likely.

The Model Business Corporation Act and the business judgment rule
allow a corporation much freedom in the use of golden parachutes.
On the other hand, in the area of tender offers, golden parachutes
become more than just a form of compensation in line with pension and
retirement plans. Golden parachutes become an effective bargaining
tool between the target company and the bidder. A conventional tender

offer "normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy
shares of a company usually at a price above the current market
price."2 5 When the tender offeror has acquired a controlling amount of

21.

See Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). See also

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 357(1) (Supp. 1977) .
22. F. BALDWIN, CONFLICTING INTERESTS 25 (1984). However, the business
judgment rule has come under recent criticism with some courts now substituting their

judgment for that of a corporation's board of directors. This result has occurred where
there has been obvious board bias or where the board or shareholders have not been
fully informed. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91, 921 at 90,552 (Del. Jan. 29, 1985).
23. Dent, The Powers of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit? 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 98 n.14 (1980).
24. However, certain restrictions do apply. A board of directors must show good
faith and no bias. Therefore, if the board is named as defendant in a shareholder's
derivative suit, they lose their independence. Corporations have gotten around this provision by setting up special litigation committees who make an investigative report and
recommend whether the suit should continue. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss3/4
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shares, a takeover occurs.2 6 However, in order to accumulate the requisite number of shares, the bidder and the target corporation may negotiate for the tender price of shares of stockholders. Since the bidder's
price for the shares of the corporation is usually well above current
market price, most shareholders will welcome the offer.2" However,
even though a director-officer must always act in the best interests of
the shareholders, he may attempt to fight this profitable takeover in
order to save his job.28 Within one year of most takeovers the previous
management is usually replaced.29 It is during this tender offer period
that a director-officer's loyalty may be questioned due to an inherent
conflict of interest. 30 A breach of fiduciary duty is possible without a
golden parachute because a director-officer is put in the position of
choosing between his job or securing a profitable deal for his shareholders. However, the existence of a golden parachute is a strong outside
factor which further weakens the relationship between a shareholder
and a director-officer.
Golden parachutes can lead to breach of fiduciary duty in two
main ways. First, one who is in a fiduciary position, such as an officer
or key executive, "cannot serve himself first and [shareholders] second." 31 His loyalty must be undivided and influenced only by corporate
considerations. 3 However, since an officer will be guaranteed a large
sum of money if a takeover occurs, his incentive and motivation to inform and protect shareholders is likely to diminish. Although it is argued conversely that a corporate officer may work harder for shareholders by having the security of a golden parachute, it is questionable
whether this type of person should have been hired initially because a
"corporation under siege should not be manned by the unsure or insecure."33 If an officer needs the assurance of a golden parachute in order
to fight a takeover perhaps he does not have the self confidence that is
necessary to do an effective job. Therefore, golden parachutes insure

26. A tender offer is by no means the only way to acquire a corporation. Other
methods which will not be discussed involve exchange of assets, mergers, and proxy
fights. See F. BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 168.
27. Id. at 167.
28. Id.
29. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 27.
30. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981).
31. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939).
32. Id.
33. Note, Future Executive Bail Outs: Will Golden ParachutesFill the American Business Skies?, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 615, 621 (1983).
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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security but increase self-motivation, not fiduciary motivation.
Furthermore, golden parachutes are a drain on a corporation's assets in purely economic terms. An acquiring corporation may reduce its
tender offer price per share to account for the price of the golden parachute. 34 Ohio's Senator Howard Metzenbaum believes this is the primary reason for limitations on the use of golden parachutes. He stated
that acquiring corporations "are not that stupid to not allow the price
of a golden parachute to have an impact on their offering
price. . . [and]. . .shareholders wind up paying for no logical reason." 35 However, there are those who contend that the price of a golden
parachute in relation to the total acquisition price is too minimal to be
a decisive factor in discouraging takeovers.3 6 Gulf Resources Corporation, for example, has golden parachutes totalling thirteen million dollars, an amount which would undoubtedly cause substantial impact on
a bidder.3 7 It is difficult to see how golden parachutes such as these can
promote the best interests of a shareholder. A shareholder's major objective is profit. Arguably, the existence of a golden parachute clearly
conflicts with this objective when corporate funds are used to pay executives rather than channeled to the shareholders through profits.
III.
A.

Shareholder's Remedies for Golden Parachutes

Derivative Actions Under State Law

One line of defense a shareholder may have against golden
parachutes is a derivative suit. A shareholder has a right to bring an
action on behalf of his corporation for the purpose of remedying wrongs
to the corporation in the form of a derivative lawsuit. 8 A prerequisite
34. Note, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses, 28 VILL. L. REv. 51 (1982). For
example: "[If Company X was willing to offer $20 per share for Company Y's shares,
it might offer $18 instead which would take into account the $2 per share cost of the
severance benefits." Id. at 70.
35. 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1956 (1983).

36. See Morrison, supra note 7, at 86.
37. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 23. Furthermore, this corporation showed a
loss of $77.9 million in comparison to a net profit of $12.7 million in 1981. Id.
38. See H. HENN & J.ALEXANDER, supra note 13 at 1035 which provides:
Equity developed the derivative action so that the shareholder derivatively
or secondarily could enforce a corporate right against insiders or directors
where those in control of the corporation refused to have the corporation
sue directly and thereby protect the whole community of corporate interests-creditors and shareholders, including [his] own investment in the cor-

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss3/4
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under most state statutes is that the complainant must have been a
shareholder of the corporation at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.39
However, the courts have imposed further restrictions on derivative
suits by consistently holding that for derivative suit purposes the complainant must have been a shareholder not only at the time of the
transaction in question, but also must remain a shareholder throughout
the litigation.40 In the absence of such status the complainant no longer
has standing to proceed with the suit. 41 This standing problem has become the shareholder's nemisis in golden parachute litigation. In the
foremost case on golden parachutes to date, Lewis v. Anderson,42 the
Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous rulings that a plaintiff
who ceases to become a shareholder by reason of a merger loses standing to continue a derivative suit.
In Lewis, the plaintiff sued on behalf of the shareholders of Conoco, which had been the target of a successful takeover by Dupont.43
The shareholders alleged that the directors, in anticipation of a potential takeover, entered into nine golden parachute contracts with key officers valued at five million dollars each, effective when the takeover
occurred." The shareholders contended that these golden parachutes
were "illegal, improper. . .and a waste of corporate assets. ' 45 However, because the shareholders had sold their Conoco stock during the
takeover, the defendant corporation moved to dismiss the suit for lack
of standing. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
granting of the motion and did not address the legality of golden
parachutes. 6

poration. The derivative action, because of its procedural development, is
equitable in nature and besides often involves equitable issues of breach of
fiduciary duty but can involve law issues of due care and claims for
damages.
Id.
39. Id. at 1058.
40. See Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 765-66 (Del. Ch. 1964); Heit v.
Tenneco, Inc., 319 F.Supp. 884, 886 (D. Del. 1970).
41. Braasch, 199 A.2d at 767 holding that "by virtue of the merger... the derivative rights [of a shareholder] have passed to the surviving corporation" Id.
42. 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984).
43. Id. at 1042.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. However, the court emphasized that if there was indeed a wrong committed,
New Conoco (Dupont, Inc.) could bring an action against the management of Old
Conoco on behalf of the shareholders of Old Conoco. But considering that New Conoco
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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The effect of such a dismissal for lack of standing appears to leave
no apparent remedy to the shareholder in the form of a derivative lawsuit under state law. Two cases have made exceptions to the standing

prerequisite of continued shareholder status throughout the litigation.
One case found that an exception exists when a corporation becomes a
subsidary of another corporation. 47 The second case created an exception when a corporation is forced to reorganize pursuant to government
antitrust laws. 48 No further exceptions for golden parachutes appear
imminent. Despite this pessimistic forecast, distraught shareholders
have continued to question the legality of golden parachutes in corpo-

rate activities by suing the corporation under a breach of fiduciary duty
claim. 49 In light of these shareholders' absence of success, a better approach may be to attack golden parachutes as a violation of a federal
securities law.

B.

Actions Under Federal Law for Violations of Section 14(e)
of the Williams Act

A shareholder may have a cause of action for violation of a federal
securities law under section 14(e) of the Williams Act.50 The Williams
Act is an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and

the Act's purpose is to require full and fair disclosure to a shareholder

in relation to a tender offer. 51 To accomplish this purpose, the Act pro-

hibits fradulent activities in connection with a tender offer. Only the
Securities and Exchange Commission has been granted express authority by Congress to act under section 14(e) .52 However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has sought action only under section 14(e)
joined Old Conoco in the motion to dismiss, this is an unlikely solution for the shareholders. Id. at 1050.
47. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22 (Del. Ch. 1982). The merger in question was a mere corporation facelift and the stockholder retained his ownership interest
in the corporation.
48. Helfand v. Gambee, 136 A.2d 558 (Del. Ch. 1957).
49. See generally Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir.
1984); Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983); Brandon v. Chefetz, 121
Misc.2d 54, 467 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Zimmerman v. Bell, 585 F.
Supp. 512 (D. Md. 1984).
50. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)) (1968).
51. H.R. REP. No. 91-1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1970 CONG. &
AD. NEws 5052.
52. Id. §5.
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on eight occasions, 53 while private individuals have brought actions
under section 14(e) over 300 times.5 ' Therefore, although the Act does
not expressly grant an individual shareholder the power to use section
14(e), the courts have continued to imply a cause of action for the individual shareholder under section 14(e).
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act requires the plaintiff to prove
that the target company made a misleading statement or omission of a
material fact or an intent to defraud third party investors in relation to
tender offers.5 5 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that he subsequently relied on the misrepresentations and suffered damage.5 6 Therefore, a shareholder who is seeking damages for a golden parachute may
either base his Williams Act claim on negligence or fraud.
Courts have struggled with the definition of a misstatement or
omission of a material fact under the Williams Act in relation to a
tender offer. Some courts have held that shareholders must prove only
negligence 58 and other courts require the more stringent test of showing
a reckless failure by directors of a corporation to make reasonable facts
available to shareholders that shareholders could have discovered with
reasonable effort.5 9 This distinction may become important when examining the disclosure requirements for golden parachutes and their im-

53. Note, Securities Law: Implied Causes of Action Under Section 14(E) of The
Williams Act, 66 MINN. L. REv. 865, 870 n.23 (1982).
54. Id. at 870 n.23.
55. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (n)(e)) (1968). § 78 (n)(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition
to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Id.
56. See Chris Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
57. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (n)(e)) (1968).
58. See SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1268 (D.D.C. 1978).
59. Chris Craft , 480 F.2d at 363.
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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pact on the shareholder. A shareholder may be able to discover the
existence of golden parachutes with reasonable effort but the question
becomes should he have to make such an effort.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is attempting to restrict
the use of golden parachutes through specific disclosure provisions. Revised Item 402(e)60 , an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1933, requires a separate disclosure for compensation paid to an executive triggered by a change in control."1 However, there are many
loopholes in this provision that may permit an omission of a material
fact that would be misleading under the Williams Act. For example,
the new disclosure provision requires individual disclosure of golden
parachutes only for the top five employees of a corporation, and group
disclosure for all executive officers.6 2 However, United Technologies
Corporation has golden parachutes for 64 of its employees, Kimberly
Clark Corporation protects 80 executives, and Beneficial Corporation
maintains golden parachutes for a staggering 250 executives. 3 These
numbers of covered employees appear way beyond the disclosure requirements. Therefore, the amount of a golden parachute compensation
disclosed to a shareholder may be, in reality, a mere fraction of the
total price a corporation may be required to pay to its executives upon
the triggering event. This omission may be sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Williams Act.
Furthermore, although disclosure is required for a change in control agreement, there are many definitions of what constitutes a change
of control. 64 Although acquisition of fifty-one percent of the shares of a
corporation is a standard definition, working control in many cases may
be obtained with less than a majority of shares. 65 Therefore, according
to the provisions of a particular golden parachute agreement even a
twenty percent investment block or smaller percentage of shares could
trigger the payoff.6" Mohasco Corporation and Olin Corporation are

60. See Final SEC Rules On Disclosure of Executive Compensation, 15 SEc.
& L. REP. (BNA) at 1852 (Sept. 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Final SEC
Rules].
REG.

61.
62.
63.

64.

Id.

Id. at 1854.
See Morrison, supra note 7, at 86.
See Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM L. REV. 1212, 1213-16

(1958).

65. Id. at 1213.
66. See generally Meyer, Lawyer's Lament, Arbitrager'sDelight,

FORBES, May

24, 1982, at 31.
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examples of two companies in which a twenty percent change of ownership will trigger their respective golden parachutes.6 7 Since the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 402(e) doesn't specifically define
what constitutes a change in control, the shareholder is basically unaware under what circumstances the parachute may be paid. Although a
specific change in control section was proposed, it has not been
adopted."8 The Commission felt that these disclosed matters were encompassed in other sections. Therefore, disclosure of golden parachutes
can remain relatively hidden behind a myriad of ambiguous terms.6,
The golden parachute becomes lost among other types of bonuses when
there is no specific change in control section. A company's failure to
disclose its change in control terms that trigger its golden parachutes
could further be a misleading omission under the Williams Act.
The major problem, however, with a shareholder pursuing a remedy for golden parachutes is that courts have held that the Williams
Act is not applicable to mere breach of fiduciary duty.70 A shareholder
seeking to hold corporate officers liable for a negligent omission of a
material fact in relation to disclosure of a golden parachute may, in
reality, be alleging merely a breach of fiduciary duty. The rationale for
imposing this restriction on the Williams Act is that state law governs
fiduciary duty of corporations and to impose a federal standard of fiduciary duty would constitute an overlap of state and federal law.71 As
previously noted, however, a shareholder will most likely not be able to
proceed with a lawsuit under state law because of the standing problem. Since there is no viable state remedy for a shareholder attacking a
golden parachute after a takeover has occurred, a Williams Act claim
under federal law used would not be usurping a state's power to govern
fiduciary duty claims.
A potential problem in using the Williams Act is that courts have

67.
68.

See Morrison, supra note 7, at 87.
See Final SEC Rules, supra note 60, at 1856.

69.

However, at least one court has held that merely disclosing the formula for

calculating a golden parachute is inadequate because it did not stress the importance of
this compensation. See Negligence Standard,Not Scienter, Test of Proxy Disclosure's
Adequacy, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1740 (Sept. 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Negligence Standard].
70. See Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Berman v. Gerber
Products, 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
71. Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 621, 649 (1983).
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72
ruled that section 14(e) is not applicable to some defensive tactics
because they are not sufficiently manipulative or deceptive to fall
within 14(e). 73 To maintain an action under section 14(e) of the Williams Act it would appear that a stronger claim than breach of fiduciary duty is needed. Not only would a shareholder have to show a material omission that is misleading, but most likely would have to show
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with the
tender offer. But there are some golden parachutes created in anticipation of a takeover that may be fraudulent and manipulative.
A target company does not have to disclose its merger talks with a
bidder. 74 A shareholder need only be informed once there is an agreement on price and structure.7 5 It is possible that target management
could create a golden parachute during these talks since golden
parachutes require no shareholder ratification, 76 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission does not require a corporation to disclose
whether this plan was ratified by the shareholders. 77 Arguably then, a
corporation may create golden parachutes to forestall the takeover bid
or to pay themselves a bonus when the takeover becomes apparent. Although the motive may be self-interest, the result is a reduction in a
shareholder's price per share due to the inclusion of the golden
parachutes. 78 In this respect, certain golden parachutes can be viewed
as a manipulative device which involves conduct that artifically affects
market activity so as to mislead investors.7 9 Market activity mustobe
artificially affected to the extent that the activity is disguised or deliberately concealed from investors.8 0 Therefore, the computations of
golden parachutes in the offering price to a shareholder during a tender
offer period may be disguised activity because their bargaining effect

72. Altman, 431 F. Supp. at 314. Berman, 454 F. Supp. at 1318.
73. See Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
74. Greenfield v. Heublin, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3rd Cir. 1984).
75.

Id.

76. Ratification shifts the burden to the shareholder to prove unfairness of the
plan and the business judgment rule then applies. Without ratification, where directors
are fixing their own compensation, the burden is on the directors to show good faith
and fairness. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979).
77. "Ratification disclosure is not material since investors are mainly concerned
with the terms of the plan and not its likelihood of shareholder approval." See Negligence Standard, supra note 69, at 1742.

78. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1982, at 6, col. 6.
79. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
80. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
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might have depressed the value of a shareholder's stock.
Furthermore, even if there has been full disclosure to shareholders
of golden parachutes, section 14(e) can still apply, if the effect of the
disclosure gives the shareholders "no real alternative than to accept the
offer.""' This could occur when a corporation has large blocks of institutional investors who are traditionally pro management and ultimately
control the outcome of a tender offer at the expense of minority shareholders. 2 In essence, the minority shareholder is forced into a position
of tendering his shares to the acquiring corporation. In this regard, during a tender offer period, golden parachutes can become fraudulent,
manipulative devices and a shareholder may be able to maintain a
cause of action under the Williams Act. However, the problems with
categorizing golden parachutes as a fiduciary matter coupled with the
traditional view of the Williams Act as used to control rigged sales,
wash sales, or other extremely manipulative activities,83 may make this
federal claim more difficult.
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers is attempting to control the use of golden parachutes
during tender offer periods through specific proposals. The Advisory
Committee has expressed concern about a board of directors' adoption
of golden parachutes after a tender offer period has begun. As a result
of this concern, the Committee has proposed a provision which would
prohibit a corporation from adopting change in control contracts during
a tender offer period.84 Furthermore, the Committee recommends that
at each annual meeting shareholders should be requested to vote on an
advisory basis as to whether the corporation should continue to use
golden parachutes. 85 By restricting the use of golden parachutes during
a tender offer period and making the shareholder more aware of their
existence, a board of directors may become more reluctant in creating
them initially. The Advisory Committee's proposals may be the best
solution to the problem of golden parachutes and would reduce the
need for after the fact litigation.

81. Id. at 377.
82. Note, supra note 1, at 356.
83. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
84. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers Special Report,
REP. (CCH) No. 1028 at 40 (Recommendation 38) (July 15, 1983).
85. Id. at 39.
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Attacking Golden Parachutes from the Back Door: The
1984 Tax Reform Act

Although the Securities and Exchange Commission may be tightening its control of golden parachutes, the Internal Revenue Service
has taken an active step in restricting their use as well. The 1984 Tax
Reform Act has established that "no deduction is allowed for payments
to key officers under golden parachute contracts which exceed reasonable compensation and such excess payments are subject to a twenty
percent excise tax". 86 Prior to this Act, corporations were allowed a
deduction for all expenses that were ordinary and necessary to carry on
business. s7 Inclusive in these expenses were reasonable allowances for
salaries or other compensations."8 Since golden parachutes had not
been adjudged to be unreasonable, 89 the cost to the corporation of paying these change in control bonuses were deducted as an expense.9"
The reason Congress has enacted this golden parachute provision
is two-fold. First, the Senate Finance Committee believed that golden
parachutes served no benefit to the corporation but merely permitted
an "entrenched management team to stay in control." 91 Second, the
Committee believed that golden parachutes may provide corporate
funds to subsidize officers or other highly compensated executives when
these individuals leave the corporation. 92 The Committee was "unwilling to let the tax law be used in such a manner that would encourage
this subsidy." 93 Therefore, it was deemed necessary to impose a penalty
when a corporation granted a golden parachute to a key executive.
Under the 1984 Tax Reform Act, no deduction is allowed for any
94
compensation arrangement which is an "excess parachute payment".
An "excess parachute payment" is one that is three times greater than
an individual's base amount, which basically entails his average gross
86. I.R.C., §§ 280(G), 4999 (1984), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, §46, 98 STAT. 585 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act of
1984].
87. Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH Special)
No. 16 at 195 (April 5, 1984).
88. Id. at 195.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
90. See Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The RIA Complete Analysis of the 1984 Tax Reform Act, Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d § 254 (1984).
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income over the past five years."' For example, if an individual's base
amount is $100,000, a single payment totalling $400,000 is an "excess
parachute payment" because it exceeds $300,000 (three times the base
amount of $100,000). 96 Under the Act, the $300,000 is nondeductible
($400,000 minus base amount of $100,000), not just the $100,000 that
is in excess of what the Committee believes is reasonable compensation. 97 Also, the recipient of this golden parachute will have to pay
$60,000 in excise taxes ($300,000 x 20%) in addition to regular income
taxes. 98 However, a corporation will be able to reduce the amount of
the "excess parachute payment" if it can show by clear and convincing
evidence that the excess portion is reasonable compensation for services
actually rendered. 99 Furthermore, although there is a standard formula
for calculating excess parachute payments, any contract which the Securities and Exchange Commission classifies as violative of Federal Securities Laws or Regulations will be subject to the no deduction penalty
of the Act.100
The 1984 Tax Reform Act imposes a heavy tax penalty on a corporation granting golden parachutes. It is difficult to comprehend why
Congress has granted this right to the IRS to restrict golden
parachutes in the form of a tax penalty. A corporation is taxed for the
privilege of doing business as a corporation - a privilege created by
the government.10 ' Therefore, the government is justified in- receiving
income in order to distribute the cost of government fairly, and to promote economic growth, stability and efficiency which are the basic
goals of the tax system.' 02 However, the projected revenue that the IRS
will receive from golden parachutes is less than five million dollars. 103
This pales in comparison to the 31.3 billion dollars corporations paid in
95. Id. The actual formula is:
the aggregate present value of all such contingent compensation payments
that equal or exceeds three times the base amount. The base amount is the
average annualized compensation includable in a disqualified individual's
gross income in the five-taxable-year period preceding the taxable year in
which the change of ownership or control of the corporation occurs.
Id., § 280 (G)(b)(d).

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 97.
99. Id. at 99.
100. Id. at 97.
101.

J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 129 (1983).

102.
103.

Id. at 5.
Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, supra note 87, at 196.
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taxes in 1982.104 Furthermore, the underlying reason behind the golden
parachute provision in the 1984 Act is a general distain of corporations
using golden parachutes as a defensive tactic to remain in control. 10 5
Arguably, the IRS should not be regulating a corporation's management decisions by imposing a tax penalty. However, it appears that
Congress is unwilling to rule that golden parachutes are illegal and is
unwilling to grant enforcement rights to the Securities and Exchange
Commission which seems to be the proper agency to regulate golden
parachutes.
It is still too early to determine whether the 1984 Tax Reform Act
will cause a great reduction in the use of golden parachutes by corporations. In the opinion of one treasurer of a major corporation'0 6 listed on
the American Stock Exchange, golden parachutes will continue to be
used despite the tax law. 107 This treasurer believes that golden
parachutes are still very viable because "as with any tax law there are
loopholes". 10 8 A corporation could avoid the harsh effects of the tax by
"basically increasing an executive's base amount thereby allowing a
parachute payment to come within the three times limitation". 10 9 Alternatively, he felt that a corporation that is a frequent target may
increase an employee's pension plan which is compensation that does
not fall within an individual's base amount. 110 Therefore, it appears
that just as corporations have managed to side step disclosure provisions regarding golden parachutes, they will also discover alternative
methods to escape the 1984 Tax Act.

V.

Conclusion

Golden parachutes are created in many forms and encompass varying amounts. Some may be reasonably within a corporation's frame-

104. PECHMAN, supra note 97, at 144.
105. Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, supra note 87. However, it is possible
that this could make golden parachutes a stronger defensive weapon since an acquiring
corporation would have to compute twice the amount of the golden parachute since it is
not deductible as an expense.
106. This corporation is a public corporation on the American Stock Exchange
and a potential target for a takeover.
107. Telephone interview with the treasurer of a corporation listed on the American Stock Exchange (Feb. 1, 1985).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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work. However, golden parachutes that are created in relation to tender
offers require close scrutiny. An executive who has a golden parachute
is likely to have a conflict of interest which may ultimately lead to a
breach of fiduciary duty or even fraud. However, an effective remedy is
presently unavailable to the shareholder either at the state or federal
level. The 1984 Tax Reform Act may have created a deterrence that
the shareholder has been unable to accomplish. Yet the fact remains
that the golden parachute is still a legal corporate creation whose ultimate victim is the shareholder.
Lynn A. Epstein
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